This paper shows that the power law property of the firm size distribution is a robust prediction of the standard entry-exit model of firm dynamics. Only one variation is required: the usual restriction that firm productivity lies below an ad hoc upper bound is dropped. We prove that, after this small modification, the Pareto tail of the distribution is predicted under a wide and empirically plausible class of specifications for firm-level productivity growth. We also provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which the entry-exit model exhibits a unique stationary recursive equilibrium in the setting where firm size is unbounded.
Introduction
The right-hand tail of the firm size distribution closely resembles a power law. 1 This property is highly significant for a range of aggregate outcomes. For example, Carvalho and Grassi (2019) used a calibrated model of industry dynamics to show that idiosyncratic firm-level shocks generate substantial aggregate volatility when the firm size distribution has the power law property (also referred to as a Pareto tail or In other words, for some measure of firm size S, there are positive constants C and α such that È{S > s} ≈ Cs −α for large s. A well known reference is Axtell (2001) . The power law finding has been replicated in many studies. See, for example, Gaffeo et al. (2003) , who treats the G7 economies, as well as Cirillo and Hüsler (2009) , Kang et al. (2011) and Zhang et al. (2009) , who use Italian, Korean and Chinese data respectively. fat tail). Aggregate volatility is generated because, with such heavy tails, the volatility contained in averages over independent shocks remains substantial even when the number of draws is large. Their work builds on Nirei (2006) and Gabaix (2011) , who previously showed that idiosyncratic firm-level volatility can account for a substantial fraction of aggregate volatility when shocks have heavy tails.
As well as volatility, the properties of the right tail of the firm size distribution also affect the both the wealth distribution and the income distribution, and hence the concentration of income and wealth, due to the high concentration of firm ownership and entrepreneurial equity. 2 The income and wealth distributions in turn affect many other economic phenomena, including the composition of aggregate demand and the growth rate of aggregate productivity. 3 One related issue concerning heavy tails is that, for such distributions, averages and nonparametric statistics provide relatively little guidance on likely future outcomes, even when sample sizes are large. 4 Thus, data arising from such distributions must be supplemented by theory in order to make quantitative statements with any reasonable degree of accuracy. In other words, to accurately predict the time path of the aggregate variables discussed above under different policy settings or other economic scenarios, it is necessary to construct models that contain within them a prediction for the right-hand tail of the firm size distribution.
Occam's razor recommends reproducing the tail of the firm size distribution from the simplest model possible, conditional on realistic assumptions and internal consistency. A natural candidate for this purpose is the entry-exit model of Hopenhayn (1992) , which forms one of the cornerstones of quantitative economics and has been successful in replicating several other key aspects of the firm size distribution. This leads to the question posed in the present study: Does the benchmark Hopenhayn (1992) model reproduce the Pareto tail (i.e., power law) of the distribution as an equilibrium prediction under realistic assumptions on firm-level productivity growth?
The issue of what constitutes "realistic" firm-level productivity growth is critical here, since the exogenously specific dynamics for idiosyncratic firm-level productivity play a key role in shaping aggregate outcomes in the entry-exit model. A commonly used baseline for modeling firm growth is Gibrat's law, which postulates that growth is stationary, with mean and volatility of the growth rate both invariant to firm size. However, this baseline is not itself realistic, as a long series of empirical studies have shown that firm growth deviates from Gibrat's law in systematic ways. For example, small firms typically grow faster than large firms. 5 A second deviation is that the growth rate of small firms is more volatile than that of large firms. 6 Any realistic specification of firm dynamics must admit these departures from Gibrat's law. This paper takes a theoretical approach to the problems raised above. We analyze a setting that admits a broad range of specifications of firm-level dynamics, including those with the systematic departures from Gibrat's law. For example, small firms can grow faster than large firms and their growth rates can exhibit greater volatility. In this setting we prove that when any of these firm-level dynamics are inserted into the standard Hopenhayn (1992) model, the endogenous firm size distribution generated by entry and exit exhibits a Pareto tail. Moreover, this result does not depend on the shape of the entrants' distribution, beyond a simple moment condition, or the demand side of the market. In this sense, the Pareto tail becomes a highly robust prediction of the standard entry-exit model once the state space is allowed to be unbounded.
We also show that the tail index, which determines the amount of mass in the right tail of the distribution and has been the source of much empirical discussion (see, e.g., Axtell (2001) or Gabaix (2016) ), depends only on the law of motion for incumbents. As such, it is invariant to the productivity distribution for new entrants, the profit functions of firms, and the structure of demand. For example, corporate tax policy has no impact on the tail index of the firm size distribution (unless it affects the growth rate of firm productivity).
The results described above are valid whenever the deviation between incumbents' firm-level growth dynamics and Gibrat's law is not infinitely large, in the sense of 5 Some of the many studies showing faster firm growth for small firms are Evans (1987b ), Evans (1987a and Hall (1987) .
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Studies showing this relationship include Hymer and Pashigian (1962) and Dunne et al. (1989) .
More references with similar findings and an overview of the literature can be found in Santarelli et al. (2006) . expected absolute value. Although this restriction is surprisingly weak, it tends to bind more for large firms than for small ones, since large firms have greater weight in the integral that determines expected value. This restriction is consistent with the data, since large firms tend to conform more to Gibrat's law than do small ones (see, e.g., Evans (1987a) , Evans (1987b) or Becchetti and Trovato (2002) ). It also provides intuition behind our results, since large firms matter more for the properties of the tail of the firm size distribution. The machinery employed to prove these results draws on Goldie (1991) , which uses implicit renewal theory to analyze Pareto tails of a range of time-invariant probability laws.
In addition to the contribution described above, the extension of the standard Hopenhayn (1992) model to an unbounded state space provided in this paper has independent value, since, as noted above, appropriate theoretical structure is necessary for quantitative analysis in the presence of heavy tails. This extension to the model is nontrivial in three ways. First, the lifetime profits of firms are potentially unbounded, requiring a modified approach to the firm decision problem. Second, the time invariance condition for the equilibrium measure of firms concerns stationary distributions of Markov transitions that are possibly transient, due to the unboundedness of productivity. Third, aggregate output is potentially infinite, since integration across productivity states is over an unbounded set.
We tackle the unbounded entry-exit model using a combination of weighted supremum norms for the firm decision problem and Kac's Theorem plus a drift condition to handle productivity dynamics. Through this combination, we provide an exact necessary and sufficient condition for existence and uniqueness of a stationary recursive equilibrium in the unbounded setting, as well as a decomposition of the equilibrium firm size distribution and sample path interpretation via Pitman's occupation measure. The latter connects the cross-sectional mass of firms in a given region of the distribution with the occupation times of individual firms. The proof of existence of a stationary recursive equilibrium is constructive, so quantitative tractability of the entry-exit model is preserved. 7 7
The drift condition that we use to handle productivity dynamics has some independent interest.
Drift conditions are a well-known technique for controlling Markov processes on unbounded state spaces (see, e.g., Meyn and Tweedie (2012) ). The idea is to obtain a Lyapunov function (sometimes called a Foster-Lyapunov function in the Markov setting) on the state space, which is defined by two properties: One is that the function becomes large as the state diverges. The second is that the This paper builds on previous studies that have linked random firm-level growth within an industry to Pareto tails in the cross-sectional distribution of firm size. Early examples include Champernowne (1953) and Simon (1955) , who showed that Pareto tails in stationary distributions can arise if time series follow Gibrat's law along with a reflecting lower barrier. Since then it has been well understood that Gibrat's law can generate Pareto tails for the firm size distribution in models where firm dynamics are exogenously specified. Surveys can be found in Gabaix (2008) and Gabaix (2016) . Córdoba (2008) points out that Gibrat's law is not supported by the data on firm growth and considers a generalization where volatility can depend on firm size. He then shows that Pareto tails still arise in a discrete state setting under such dynamics. This paper strengthens his result in two ways. First, the firm size distribution is endogenously determined as the equilibrium outcome of an entry-exit model, allowing us to consider how regulations, policies and demand impact on the distribution. Second, we allow other departures from Gibrat's law supported by the data, such as dependence of the mean growth rate on firm size.
More recently, Carvalho and Grassi (2019) produce a Pareto tail in a model of endogenous entry and exit whenever Gibrat's law holds for incumbent dynamics and new entrants draw their productivity from a Pareto distribution. While we make no contribution to their discussion of aggregate fluctuations, this paper enhances their power law finding by allowing for a more plausible range of firm-level growth specifications, while at the same time showing that the key results are invariant to the productivity distribution of new entrants. We also work with an unbounded state space, which allows direct modeling of the Pareto tail of the firm size distribution.
There are a several studies not previously mentioned that generate Pareto tails for the firm size distribution using a number of alternative mechanisms. A classic example is Lucas (1978) , which connects heterogeneity in managerial talent to a Pareto law. More recent examples include Luttmer (2011), Acemoglu and Cao (2015) and Cao et al. (2018) . This paper does not attempt to distinguish between these models based on observed outcomes or question their significance. Rather, the objective of value assigned to the state by the Lyapunov function under the Markov process in question tends to decrease if the state variable begins to diverge. The main difficulty with the approach is funding a suitable Lyapunov function. The innovation introduced below is to use firm output itself as the Lyapunov function. this paper is to determine whether or not Pareto-tailed distributions are a robust prediction of the benchmark entry-exit model under realistic firm-level dynamics, as well as to remove tail truncation from that model to improve quantitative analysis. 8
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3 shows existence of a unique stationary recursive equilibrium when the state space is unbounded. Section 4 investigates heavy tails and Section 5 concludes. Long proofs are deferred to the appendix.
Entry and Exit
The structure of the model follows Hopenhayn (1992) . There is a single good produced by a continuum of firms, consisting at each point in time of a mixture of new entrants and incumbents. The good is sold at price p and the demand is given by D(p).
Assumption 2.1. The demand function D is continuous and strictly decreasing with D(0) = ∞ and lim p→∞ D(p) = 0.
Firms facing output price p and having firm-specific productivity ϕ generate profits π(ϕ, p) and produce output q(ϕ, p). (We take q and π as given but provide examples below where they are derived from profit maximization problems.) Profits are negative on the boundary due to fixed costs, as in Hopenhayn (1992) . In particular, Assumption 2.2. Both π and q are continuous and strictly increasing on Ê 2 + . The function q is nonnegative while π satisfies π(ϕ, p) < 0 if either ϕ = 0 or p = 0.
Productivity of each incumbent firm updates according to the idiosyncratic Markov state process Γ(ϕ, dϕ ′ ), where Γ is a transition probability kernel on Ê + . The outside option for firms is zero and the value v(ϕ, p) of of an incumbent satisfies
where β = 1/(1 + r) for some fixed r > 0. Here and below, integrals are over Ê + .
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Also tangentially related to our study, at least on a technical level, is Benhabib et al. (2015) , which studies a nonlinear process associated with optimal household savings that approximates a Kesten process when income is large. This is somewhat analogous to our treatment of the firm size distribution, in that we allow nonlinear firm-level dynamics that approximate Gibrat's law. However, the topic and underlying methodology are substantially different.
Assumption 2.3. The productivity kernel Γ is monotone increasing. In addition, (a) For each a > 0 and ϕ 0, there is an n ∈ AE such that Γ n (ϕ, [0, a)) > 0.
The symbol Γ n denotes the n-step transition kernel. The monotonicity assumption means that Γ(ϕ, [0, a]) is decreasing in ϕ for all a 0. Condition (a) is analogous to the recurrence condition in Hopenhayn (1992) . Condition (b) ensures that not all incumbents exit every period.
New entrants draw productivity independently from a fixed probability distribution γ and enter the market if v(ϕ ′ , p) γ(dϕ ′ ) c e , where c e > 0 is a fixed cost of entry.
Assumption 2.4. The distribution γ satisfies q(ϕ, p)γ(dϕ) < ∞ and puts positive mass on the interval [0, a] for all a > 0.
The first condition in Assumption 2.4 is a regularity condition that helps to ensure finite output. The second condition is convenient because it leads to aperiodicity of the endogenous productivity process.
Assumption 2.5. There exists a p > 0 such that π(ϕ, p) γ(dϕ) c e . Assumption 2.5 ensures that entry occurs when the price is sufficiently large. It is relatively trivial because, for price taking firms, revenue is proportional to price.
For realistic industry dynamics, we also need a nonzero rate of exit. We implement this by assuming that, when a firm's current productivity is sufficiently low, its expected lifetime profits are negative:
One (admittedly simplistic) example of a setting where Assumption 2.6 holds is when firm growth follows Gibrat's law, so that Γ is represented by the recursion ϕ t+1 = A t+1 ϕ t for some positive iid sequence {A t }. Then ϕ 0 = 0 implies ϕ t = 0 for all t, and hence Γ t (0, dϕ ′ ) is a point mass at zero. Hence the integral in Assumption 2.6 evaluates to π(0, p) for each t, which is negative by Assumption 2.2.
Since productivity is unbounded and profits can be arbitrarily large, we also need a condition on the primitives to ensure that v is finite. In stating it, we consider the productivity process {ϕ t } defined by ϕ 0 ∼ γ and ϕ t+1 ∼ Γ(ϕ t , dϕ ′ ) when t 1.
(2)
While slightly stricter than a direct bound on lifetime profits, Assumption 2.7 has the benefit of yielding a contraction result for the Bellman operator corresponding to the Bellman equation (1). Since we are working in a setting where profits can be arbitrarily large, the value function is unbounded, so the contraction in question must be with respect to a weighted supremum norm. To construct this norm, we take δ as in Assumption 2.7 and let
Here b is a constant chosen such that π + b 1. The function κ is constructed so that it dominates the value function and satisfies 1 κ < ∞ at all points in the state space. 9 For each scalar-valued f on Ê 2 + , let f κ := sup |f /κ|. This is the κ-weighted supremum norm. If it is finite for f then we say that f is κ-bounded. Let C := all continuous, increasing and κ-bounded functions on Ê 2
Assumption 2.8 is a version of the continuity property imposed by Hopenhayn (1992) , modified slightly to accommodate the fact that Γ acts on unbounded functions.
Stationary Recursive Equilibrium
Now we turn to existence, uniqueness and computation of stationary recursive equilibria for the industry. All the assumptions of the previous section are in force. 9 To be more precise, ϕ → κ(ϕ, p) is finite γ-almost everywhere by Assumption 2.7. If γ is supported on all of Ê + , then, since the function in question is monotone, this implies that κ is finite everywhere. If not, then we tighten the assumptions above by requiring that κ(ϕ, p) is finite everywhere.
10 Completeness of the set of continuous κ-bounded functions under d is proved in many places,
including Hernández-Lerma and Lasserre (2012), §7.2. Our claim of completeness of (C , d) follows from the fact that the limit of a sequence of increasing functions in (C , d) is also increasing.
3.1. Existence and Uniqueness. We begin our analysis with the firm decision problem:
is a contraction on (C , d). Its unique fixed point v * is strictly increasing and strictly negative if either ϕ = 0 or p = 0.
Now letφ be the function on Ê + defined bȳ
With the convention that incumbents who are indifferent remain rather than exit, an incumbent with productivity ϕ exits if and only if ϕ <φ(p). In (5) we take the usual convention that min ∅ = ∞.
Lemma 3.2. The optimal exit threshold functionφ satisfiesφ(0) = ∞ and is finite, strictly positive and decreasing on (0, ∞).
The equilibrium entry condition is v * (ϕ, p)γ(dϕ) c e and, whenever the mass of entrants M is strictly positive,
Lemma 3.3. There exists a unique price p * > 0 such that (6) holds.
For stationarity, the measure µ of current firm productivity levels must satisfy the invariance condition
where B is all Borel sets on Ê + andφ is as in (5). Stationarity also requires balanced entry and exit, which mean that M = µ{ϕ <φ(p)}. In particular, a stationary recursive equilibrium for this model is a positive constant p, a finite Borel measure µ on Ê + and an M 0 such that when p is the output price, µ is the distribution of firms, and M is the mass of firms that enter in each period, the equilibrium entry condition holds, the time-invariance condition (13) is valid, there is balanced entry and exit, and the goods market clears:
We can now state our main existence and uniqueness result. In stating it, we we take {ϕ t } to be as in (2) and set τ (p) to be the lifespan of a firm with this productivity path when output price is p:
Expected lifetime firm output at p is
Let p * be the unique price consistent with the entry condition (see Lemma 3.3). The next theorem characterizes equilibrium for the entry-exit model set out in Section 2.
Theorem 3.4. The following two statements are logically equivalent:
(a) Expected lifetime output for firms is finite.
(b) A stationary recursive equilibrium exists.
If either and hence both of these statements is true, then the equilibrium is unique, the equilibrium mass of entrants M * is strictly positive, and the distribution of productivity µ * and M * satisfy
Condition (a) in Theorem 3.4 requires ℓ(p * ) < ∞. While p * is not a primitive, a simple sufficient condition involving only primitives is given in Section 3.2.
The decomposition (10) says that the mass of firms in set B is proportional to the expected number of times that a firm's productivity visits B over its lifespan. It ties the cross-sectional distribution of productivity to dynamics at the level of the firm. The decomposition is obtained by a combination of Kac's Theorem and the Pitman occupation formula. The proof of Theorem 3.4 is constructive and the basic approach and its numerical implementation are discussed in Section 3.3 below. 11 11 The traditional entry-exit model, with productivity bounded above by some constant B, is a special case of Theorem 3.4. To see this, observe that q K for some constant K in such a 3.2. A Sufficient Condition. We now give a simple sufficient condition for ℓ(p * ) < ∞, which in turn implies all of the conclusion of Theorem 3.4.
Assumption 3.1. For each p > 0, there exists an λ ∈ (0, 1) and L < ∞ such that
Assumption 3.1 says that output growth for incumbents is expected to be negative whenever current output is sufficiently large. 12 In the literature on Markov processes, the bound in (11) is sometimes called a Foster-Lyapunov drift condition. In the present case, output q is adopted as the Lyapunov function.
Proposition 3.5. If, in addition to the conditions in Section 2, Assumption 3.1 holds, then expected lifetime output for each firm is finite.
The intuition behind Proposition 3.5 is as follows. When Assumption 3.1 is in force, incumbents with sufficiently large output tend to see output fall in the next period.
Output is a strictly increasing function of ϕ, so falling output means falling productivity. From this one can construct a finite interval such that, for any given incumbent, productivity returns to this interval infinitely often. At each such occasion, the recurrence condition in Assumption 2.3 yields an independent ε probability of exiting. Eventually the firm exits and lifetime output remains finite. 13
Example 3.1. Suppose that incumbent productivity grows according to
setting, so ℓ(p * ) K τ (p * ). The expected firm lifespan τ (p) is finite at every p > 0, since, by Assumption 2.3, there exists an integer n such that ε := Γ n (B, [0,φ(p))) > 0, and hence {ϕ t } falls belowφ(p) with independent probability at least ε every n periods. This means that τ (p) = m∈AE È{τ(p) m} m∈AE (1 − ε) ⌊m/n⌋ , which is finite. Hence ℓ(p * ) is finite, and a stationary recursive equilibrium exists.
12 To see this, we can write q(ϕ t , p) as Q t and express (11) as ln( t Q t+1 /Q t ) ln(λ + L/Q t ). When Q t is sufficiently large, the right-hand side is negative.
13 Even though lifetime output is finite along every sample path, this does not necessarily imply that the expectation of lifetime output ℓ(p * ) is finite. Hence there are some subtleties involved in the proof of Proposition 3.5. The reason that output is used as the Lyapunov function is that we need this expectation to be finite. The appendix gives details.
that production is linear in ϕ and that all factors of production are constant, so that q(ϕ, p) = eϕ for some e > 0. Regarding the drift condition (11), we have
Assumption 3.1 is therefore satisfied whenever A t < 1 and Y t < ∞.
Example 3.2. Suppose instead that production is Cobb-Douglas, with output ϕn θ under labor input n and parameter θ ∈ (0, 1). With profits given by pϕn θ − c − wn for some c, w > 0, the function for output at optimal labor input is
.
If productivity growth follows ϕ t+1 = A t+1 ϕ t , then the right-hand side of the drift condition (11) becomes
Thus, Assumption 3.1 is valid whenever [
] < 1. This is a joint restriction on the rate of incumbent firm growth and the Cobb-Douglas production parameter θ.
3.3. Computing the Solution. When proving Theorem 3.4, our first step is to insert balanced entry and exit into the time invariance condition, yielding
where Π p is the transition kernel on Ê + defined by
Then we proceed as follows:
(S1) Take the price p * dictated by the entry condition, as in Lemma 3.3.
(S2) Take µ to be the unique stationary Borel probability measure for Π p * . Rescaling in (S3) is implemented so that the goods market clears. As shown in the proof, uniqueness in (S2) always holds because Π p is irreducible for all p > 0. The two challenging parts of the proof of Theorem 3.4 are existence of µ and positivity of s. In both cases our solution draws on Kac's Theorem. The proof in the appendix gives details.
In terms of computational methods, the value p * in (S1) can be obtained once we solve for v * . The latter is a fixed point of a contraction map, as shown in Lemma 3.1. This provides the basis of a globally convergent method of computation.
The situation for µ in (S2) is similar. It is shown in the appendix that the endogenous productivity process is aperiodic and γ-irreducible. (See Meyn and Tweedie (2012) for definitions and notation related to Markov processes.) The condition ℓ(p * ) < ∞ then implies that the same process is Harris recurrent and ergodic, opening avenues for computing µ through either simulation or successive approximations.
Stronger statements are true when Assumption 3.1 holds. We show in the proof of Proposition 3.5 that when Assumption 3.1 is in force, the transition kernel Π p is V -uniformly ergodic (Meyn and Tweedie, 2012, Chapter 16 ) for all p > 0, implying that the marginal distributions generated by Π p converge to its unique stationary distribution at a geometric rate and yielding a range of sample path properties. 14
Pareto Tails
Next we turn to the tail properties of the equilibrium distribution of firms identified by Theorem 3.4. To be certain that this distribution exists, we impose the conditions of Proposition 3.5. While we focus on productivity when analyzing firm size, heavy tails in productivity is typically mirrored or accentuated in profit-maximizing output. 15
It is convenient to introduce a function G and an iid sequence {W t } such that
obeys the incumbent dynamics embodied in the Markov kernel Γ. 16 Such a representation can always be constructed (see, e.g., Bhattacharya and Majumdar (2007) 
In other words, the distribution is such that È{X > x} goes to zero like x −α . To investigate when X has this property, we impose the following restriction on the law of motion for incumbent firms. In stating it, we take W as a random variable with the same distribution as each W t .
Assumption 4.1. There exists an α > 0 and an independent random variable A with continuous distribution function such that A α = 1, the moments A α+1 and z α γ(dz) are both finite, and
Condition (17) bounds the deviation between the law of motion (15) for incumbent productivity and Gibrat's law, which is where productivity updates via ϕ t+1 = A t+1 ϕ t . The existence of a positive α such that A α = 1 requires that A puts at least some probability mass above 1. In terms of Gibrat's law ϕ t+1 = A t+1 ϕ t , this corresponds to the natural assumption that incumbent firms grow with positive probability.
Theorem 4.1. If Assumption 4.1 holds for some α > 0, then the endogenous stationary distribution for firm productivity is Pareto-tailed, with tail index equal to α.
While Assumption 4.1 involves X, which is endogenous, we can obtain it from various sufficient conditions that involve only primitives. For example, suppose there exist independent nonnegative random variables A and Y such that (P1) Y has finite moments of all orders, (P2) A satisfies the conditions in Assumption 4.1 for some α ∈ (0, 2), and (P3) the bound |G(ϕ, W ) − Aϕ| Y holds for all ϕ 0.
We also assume that the first moment of γ is finite, although this is almost always implied by Assumption 2.4 (see, e.g., Examples 3.1-3.2).
17 In referring to this distribution, we ignore the distinction between the probability distribution µ, from which X is drawn, and the equilibrium distribution µ * identified in step (S3) of Section 3.3, since one is a rescaled version of the other and hence the tail properties are unchanged.
Condition (P3) provides a connection between incumbent dynamics and Gibrat's law. Note that the dynamics in G can be nonlinear and, since Y is allowed to be unbounded, infinitely large deviations from Gibrat's law are permitted. One simple specification satisfying (P3) is when G(ϕ, W ) = Aϕ + Y , which already replicates some empirically relevant properties (e.g., small firms exhibit more volatile and faster growth rates than large ones).
Conditions (P1)-(P3) only restrict incumbent dynamics (encapsulated by Γ in the notation of Sections 2-3). Since, in Theorem 4.1, the tail index is determined by α, these dynamics are the only primitive that influences the index on the Pareto tail. The range of values for α in (P2) covers standard estimates (see, e.g., Gabaix (2016) ).
To show that (P1)-(P3) imply the conditions of Assumption 4.1, we proceed as follows. As A satisfies the conditions of Assumption 4.1, we only need to check that (17) holds. In doing so, we will make use of the elementary bound
for nonnegative x, y. In the case 0 < α 1, we therefore have, by (P3),
But Y has finite moments of all orders by (P1), so the bound in (17) holds.
Next consider the case 1 < α < 2. Using (18) again, we have
In view of (P3) above and the identity 2 max{x, y} = |x − y| + x + y, we obtain
Setting a := 1/(α − 1) and using Jensen's inequality combined with the fact that α < 2 now yields
We need to bound the three expectations on the right hand side. In doing so we use Lemma A.6 in the appendix, which shows that X < ∞ when 1 < α < 2.
The first expectations is finite by (P1). The third is finite by (P1) and independence of Y , A and X. 18 For the second, since Y is independent of X and W , finiteness of the expectation reduces to finiteness of G(X, W ). We have
Taking expectations and observing that, given X φ(p * ), the random variable G(X, W ) has distribution Π p * (X, dϕ ′ ), we have
The equality on the right is due to stationarity of µ under the endogenous law of motion for firm productivity. Since zγ(dz) is finite by assumption and ϕµ(dϕ) = X, which is finite as stated above, we conclude that under (P1)-(P3), the conditions of Theorem 4.1 are satisfied.
Conclusion
In this paper we investigated properties of the firm size distribution in the entryexit model of Hopenhayn (1992) . We removed the upper bound on firm productivity, imposed previously in order to simplify analysis, allowing us to consider more realistic representations of firm growth. We found that the standard entry-exit model provides a direct and robust theory of the power law in firm size under realistic firm-level growth dynamics. Substantial and empirically relevant deviations from Gibrat's law were accommodated without altering these results.
The methodology developed in this paper can potentially be applied to other settings where a power law is observed. For example, the wealth distribution is Pareto tailed, while the rate of return on wealth (and hence the growth rate of wealth) has been found to vary with the level of wealth in systematic ways (see, e.g., Fagereng et al. (2016) ). Similarly, the distribution of city sizes tends to a Pareto tail. At the same time, Gibrat's law fails in this setting too (see, e.g., Córdoba (2008) ). Such topics are left to future work.
Appendix A. Proofs
In the proofs we use the operator notation
while P denotes the Borel probability measures on Ê + . The symbol means first order stochastic dominance. All notation and terminology associated with Markov models follows Meyn and Tweedie (2012) . In the next lemma, we take δ ∈ (β, 1) from Assumption 2.7.
Lemma A.1. The operator Γ is invariant on C and Γκ κ/δ.
Proof. The last claim is easy to check, since, by the definition of κ in (3), we have
Now fix u ∈ C . That Γu is κ-bounded follows from the previous inequality and the pointwise bound |u| u κ κ. Continuity of Γu is immediate from Assumption 2.8.
Regarding monotonicity, let u n = u½{u n} + n½{u > n} for each n ∈ AE. Then u n is increasing for each n and also bounded, so Γu n is increasing for each n. 19 Moreover, by the Monotone Convergence Theorem, Γu n ↑ Γu. Since monotonicity is preserved under pointwise limits, Γu is also increasing. Hence Γu ∈ C as claimed.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Pick any u ∈ C . Using (19) andπ κ, we have |T u| = |π + β max {0, Γu}| π + βΓ|u| π + β u κ Γκ (1 + β u κ /δ)κ.
Hence T u κ is finite. In addition, T u is continuous and increasing because T u = π + β max {0, Γu} and π and Γu both have these properties (by Assumptions 2.2 and 2.8). Hence T maps C into itself. In addition, T is a contraction mapping, since, given u, v in C ,
Dividing both sides by κ and taking the supremum yields d(T u, T v) (β/δ)d (u, v) .
Recalling that δ > β, the claim of contractivity is established.
To see that the fixed point v * is strictly increasing, pick any w ∈ C and observe that T w = π + β max{0, Γw} is strictly increasing, since Γw is increasing and π is strictly increasing. In other words, T maps elements of C into strictly increasing functions. Given that v * = T v * , the function v * must itself have these properties.
Finally, to see that v * (ϕ, p) < 0 if ϕ = 0 or p = 0, let h(ϕ, p) := t 1 β t ϕ |π(ϕ t , p)| where {ϕ t } is a productivity process starting at ϕ and generated by Γ. Clearly v * (ϕ, p) π(ϕ, p) + h(ϕ, p). If p = 0, then π(ϕ, p) < 0 and h(ϕ, p) 0 by Assumption 2.2. Hence v * (ϕ, p) < 0. In addition, if ϕ = 0, then profits are negative in the first period, by Assumption 2.2, and subsequent lifetime profits are nonpositive by Assumption 2.6. Once again, we have v * (ϕ, p) < 0.
0}. This set is nonempty when p > 0 by v * π and Assumption 2.3. Moreover, Φ(p) is closed because, if {ϕ n } ⊂ Φ(p) and ϕ n → ϕ, then, by the continuity in Assumption 2.8, we have 0 (Γv * )(ϕ n , p) → (Γv * )(ϕ, p). Hence (Γv * )(ϕ, p) 0 and, therefore, ϕ ∈ Φ(p).
Since Φ(p) is closed and nonempty when p > 0,φ(p) = min Φ(p) exists in Ê + .
Due to monotonicity of v * , the correspondence Φ is such that p q implies Φ(p) ⊂ Φ(q). Henceφ(p) = min Φ(p) is decreasing. Moreover, the set Φ(p) does not contain 0 because, for any p 0, we have Γv * (0, p) = v * (0, p) < 0, where the equality is by Assumption 2.3 and the inequality is by Lemma 3.1. Henceφ(p) > 0. by Assumption 2.7. The function e is also continuous on Ê + . To see this, take p n → p.
Since convergent sequences are bounded, we can choosep such that p n p for all n. By monotonicity, it follows that v * (ϕ ′ , p n ) v * (ϕ ′ ,p) for all ϕ ′ . Continuity of v * and the Dominated Convergence Theorem now give e(p n ) → e(p).
If p = 0, then, by Lemma 3.1, we have v * (ϕ, p) < 0 for all ϕ, so e(p) < 0. Conversely, if p is large enough, then π(ϕ, p)γ(dϕ) c e by Assumption 2.5. As v * π, this implies that e(p) 0. Hence, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists a p > 0 such that e(p) = 0. Uniqueness now follows from strict monotonicity of e, which in turn rests on strict monotonicity of v * (see Lemma 3.1).
Lemma A.2. For all p > 0, the transition kernel Π p is aperiodic, γ-irreducible and admits the accessible atom a p := [0,φ(p)).
Proof. Fix ϕ ∈ Ê + and let B be any Borel set such that γ(B) > 0. Let {ϕ t } be a Markov process on Ê + generated by Π p and starting at ϕ 0 = ϕ. Evidently, if
then we let m be the smallest n ∈ AE such that Γ n (ϕ, [0,φ(p)) > 0. By the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations, we have Meyn and Tweedie (2012) that Π p is positive recurrent, and hence admits a stationary probability, if and only the expected return time to a p is finite, or τ (p) < ∞. Note that, in this case, we have 
Here we have used the fact that µ * (a p * ) > 0, since a p * is an accessible atom. But then aggregate supply is infinite, while demand D(p * ) is finite. Contradiction. Now suppose instead that ℓ(p * ) is finite. Observe that, by monotonicity of q and the definition of τ (p * ), we have
Taking expectations gives τ (p * ) ℓ(p * ) < ∞. Hence, by Lemma A.3, the distribution µ defined in step (S2) of Section 3.3 is well defined.
Take µ * as given by step (S3), which is well defined by Lemma A.5. By Lemma 3.3, the equilibrium entry condition holds at p * and incumbent firms maximize profits given p * by existing when ϕ < ϕ * :=φ(p * ). The goods market clears because, by the definition of s, we have q(ϕ, p * )µ * (dϕ) = s q(ϕ, p * )µ(dϕ) = D(p * ). The triple (p * , M * , µ * ) satisfies time-invariance because, given any B in B,
Since µ satisfies (13), this last expression is just sµ(B), or, equivalently, µ * (B).
We have proved that the pair (p * , µ * ) identified by steps (S1)-(S3) yields a stationary recursive equilibrium (SRE). The equilibrium number of entrants is M * = µ * {ϕ : 
By monotonicity of Γ and the definition of Π p , we then have
Setting ν := εγ and m := n + 1 therefore gives Π m p (ϕ, B) ν(B), which verifies the claim in the lemma.
Lemma A.5. If µ ∈ P satisfies (13) and p > 0, then 0 < q(ϕ, p)µ(dϕ) < ∞.
Proof of Proposition 3.5. Adopting the conditions of Proposition 3.5, we first show that Π p is V -uniformly ergodic for all p > 0 via Theorem 16.1.2 of Meyn and Tweedie (2012) . Lemma A.2 shows that Π p is irreducible and aperiodic, so we need only show that the drift condition (V4) defined in Chapter 15 of Meyn and Tweedie (2012) is holds with respect to a petite set. By Lemma 15.2.8 of the same reference, this will be true whenever there exists a nonnegative function V on Ê + such that the sublevel set C a := {ϕ ∈ Ê + : V (ϕ) a} is petite for each a 0 and, for some positive constants α < 1 and K < ∞,
Set V (ϕ) = q(ϕ, p). For this function the sublevel sets C a are all intervals of the form [0, d] for some d 0 due to monotonicity of q. Such sets are petite by Lemma A.4. 20 The concept of petite sets is defined in Chapter 5 of Meyn and Tweedie (2012) .
Moreover, for any fixed ϕ 0, the definition of Π p and the drift condition for incumbents in (11) yields
The first term is finite by Assumption 2.4. The second term is bounded by (11). Putting these bounds together yields (21) with α := λ and K := V (ϕ ′ )γ(dϕ ′ ) + L.
Next we claim that ℓ(p) is finite for this same arbitrary p. To see this, let µ be the unique stationary distribution of Π p , existence of which is guaranteed by Vuniform ergodicity (see Theorem 16.1.2 of Meyn and Tweedie (2012) ). The term m(p) := q(ϕ, p)µ(dp) is finite by Proposition 4.24 of Hairer (2018) Hence m(p) := q(ϕ, p)µ(dp) = V (ϕ)µ(dp) = c ℓ(p). Since m(p) was just shown to be finite and c is positive, the claim is verified.
As ℓ(p) is finite for all positive p, it is finite at p * , and hence the conclusions of Theorem 3.4 hold.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. To begin, recall from (15) that the recursion ϕ t+1 = G(ϕ t , W t+1 ) reproduces the Markov dynamics for an incumbent firm embodied in Γ. If we take {Z t } to be iid draws from γ and set H(ϕ, w, z) := G(ϕ, w)½{ϕ φ(p * )} + z½{ϕ <φ(p * )},
then the recursion
reproduces equilibrium firm dynamics corresponding to Π p * .
Continuing to the proof of Theorem 4.1, we make use of the implicit renewal theory found in Corollary 2.4 of Goldie (1991) . By Assumption 4.1, the distribution function of A is continuous and hence ln A is nonarithmetic. Moreover, A α = 1 and A α+1 < ∞, the latter of which gives A α max{ln A, 0} < ∞. Hence A satisfies the conditions of Lemma 2.2 of Goldie (1991) , and, as a result, we need only check that |H(X, W, Z) α − (AX) α | is finite for H defined in (22) . 21 For this it suffices to bound expectation of the two random variables I 1 := |H(X, W, Z) α − (AX) α | ½{X <φ(p * )} = |Z α − (AX) α | ½{X <φ(p * )} and I 2 := |H(X, W, Z) α − (AX) α | ½{X φ(p * )} |G(X, W ) α − (AX) α | For I 1 we can use the triangle inequality and the bound on X to obtain I 1 Z α + A αφ (p * ), and the expectation of the right hand side is finite by our assumptions on A and Z. For I 2 , finiteness of expectation holds by the inequality on the right hand side of the definition of I 2 and Assumption 4.1.
Lemma A.6. Under conditions (a)-(c) of Section 4, the first moment of the firm size distribution is finite whenever α > 1.
Proof. Let {Z t } be iid draws from γ. Consider the upper bound process U t+1 = A t+1 U t + Y t+1 + Z t+1 . This dominates the equilibrium process pointwise, as can be seen by comparing it with (22) . It follows that the stationary µ of (22) is stochastically dominated by the stationary distribution of the upper bound process whenever the latter exists. Hence it suffices to show that the stationary solution to the upper bound process has finite first moment.
Since A α t+1 = 1 and α > 1, we must have A t+1 < 1 (see, e.g., p. 48 of Buraczewski et al. (2016) ). Finiteness of the first moment of the stationary solution to the upper bound process now follows from Theorem 5.1 of Vervaat (1979) , provided that the additive component Y t+1 + Z t+1 of this process has finite first moment. This is true under the stated assumptions, so the proof of Lemma A.6 is done.
